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1. Introduction 
Nozomu Kawamura*ホ
(河村望)
Since 1960， Jap唱nhas undergone rapid economic growth. The “miracle" of such sustained 
growth is related at， and not incidentally resu1ted in， toleration of immense industrial pollution. The 
problems of a deteriorating natural and social environment neither an unexpected nor unavoidable 
“by-product" of the high economic growth. Industrial poisoning， for e況ample，has been direct1y or 
indirect1y responsible for ki1ling large numbers of people. The impact of kogai， the general term for 
environmental pollutants， has pressed far beyond tolerabl巴limits.As government and the business 
wor1d become more successful is establishing gigantic industrial ∞mplexes， the more resu1tant kogai 
is produced. As a final consequence， the health of the Japanese people and natural beauty of the 
lands叫 peis inj巴op叫 dy.
Alihough kogai is usually translated as “pollutionヘtheconcept is unique to Jap叩 andhas a 
much wider meaning. Kogai can basically be classified into the two categories: industrial and urban. 
The first category， primari1y focusing on industrial origins includes (1) air pollution and noxious 
odors caused by soot， smoke and poisοnous gases， (2) water (river， sea and lake) and soi1 pol1ution 
caused by liquid waste， (3) noise and vibration， finally， (4) ground subsidence caused by the 
excessive withdrawal of industrial water and gas. The second category with its urban focus inc1udes 
(1) air pollution caused by car exhaust and house heat加g，(2) river pollution caused by the 
inadequate house drainage and garb唱gefacilities， (3) traffic and other miscellaneous urban noise， (4) 
such problems as tight housing， inadequate sunshing， traffic congestion，∞mmuting etc. In addition 
W官canraise the third category， i.e.politica1 kogai: the infringements on the production basis and the 
envirgnment caused by the direct exercis氾 ofstate power. These infringem巴ntsare manifest in (1) 
nοise and vibration of mi1tary bases， (2) water pollu tion cau犯dby radiation of warships， and (3) air 
pollution caused by nuc1ear testing. 
As 1 wi1 mention later， residential or citizen's movements began with pro旬sts姥ainstsuch 
kogai. Among the three types， industrial kog官irepresents about 70 percent of the civi1 outbreaks 
involving the kog官 issue.The Japanese refer to protest movements consi直tingof residents of a 
particu1ar loca1ity as“resident's movements"， but occasiona1y reserve the term “citizen's 
movement". Some people u鈎 the鈴 two∞nce 
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Before I examine the various environmental protest movements， I would like to more 
concretely delineate the pollution problem by citing the American anthropologist， Robert Smith's 
(1979:8-10) precise description. Dr. Smith， who first came to Kurusu， Kagawa Prefecture in Shikoku 
in 1951 and returned in 1975， retrospectively considers th巴“priceof progress" as fol1ows: 
In 1951 the only way of reaching Shikoku was by the boat or ferry 1ines that linked it 
to the main island of Honshu.…the view from the ferry as it swung out into the main channel 
was of a succession of small is¥ands of great1y varied shapes， some graced with gnarled plum 
and pine trees， others so dry that they were almost completely barren.... The smal1 fishing 
boats were always much thicker here， but there were almost no freighters such as could be 
seen occasional1y further out to sea. All along the shoreline up toward the great headland of 
Yashima were extensive salt fields.. 
Twenty-five years ¥ater， the crossing of the Inland Sea provides a vastly different 
prospect. Wherever the coastline has proved suitable， land reclamation projects have been 
carried out. On these great flat extension of the ¥and have been built industrial and marine 
instal1ations of al kinds -petrochemical plants， oil refineries and storage tanks， de巴pwater
berths for tankers and fl同ghters-al of w~ich discharge their wa山 S泊tothe air and into the 
waters of the sea. As a consequence， the Inland Sea has begun to die. On the very hot， humid 
and windless days of midsummer the view from the ferry is a nightmare. There are few fishing 
boats left， for most of the marine life that survives is inedible， but through the yellow-brown 
smog that blankets the entire passage on such a day one ωn see that there has been an 
巴normousincrease加 thevolume of commercial shipping. On a few islands the vegetation has 
died off completely， not from lack of water， but from the effects of pollutions discharged by 
the industrial plants that are everywhere up and down the coasts. Even the island can not be 
seen clearly any more， unless the ferry passes close by them....the greater evaporation beds of 
the salt field have long sinc been converted to landfills for泊dustrialand marine use.. In the 
perspective of twenty-five years， the crossing is an infuriating reminder of the heedlessness of 
those who have poisoned the air and the water.. 
The considerable use of Dr. Smith here is to underscore more vividly one's泊lageof the 
current state of pollution. Thus the story of citizen's environmental protests begins at the localleve1. 
Local governments have encouraged regional industrial development under the control of the 
national government. In most instances pollution can be attributed not only to industrial activity but 
a1so to the encouragement of the government's stimulation of ec 
1. Ideology and Reality of High Economic Growth 
In 1950 the government established the National Plan for the General Development ofLand 
Act to aid in war damage recovery and to develop the national economy. The basic idea of the Act 
was taken from the TV A developmental p¥an model in the U .S.A.. It aimed to establish 
multi-purpose dams for development of power resources， of agricultural production， and control of 
river systems. This development p¥an failed， however， because the ¥arge business sector wanted the 
government of spend public funds on developing industrial areas rather than underdeveloped rura1 
areas. 
In 1955， the government established the Five Year Plan for Economic Independence in which 
the economic growth rate was predicted at 5.0 percent. The actua1 rate， however， was 9.5 percent in 
1955， 8.5 percent in 1956 and eventually 17.3 percent in 1959. From this actual economic growth 
rate， the planners drew the lessons that high economic growth was not only possible but desirable. In 
1960， prIme minister Hayato Ikeda announced that the Plan would be pressed to double the national 
income which aimed in tum to double the real income of the people by 1970. In promising the 
dissolution of unemployment and pover.ty and hence， affecting more affluent living， the government 
proposed a concentration in the following five areas: (1) greater service ability of roads， harbors 
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industria11ands and waters， rai1roads， airports， etc.， (2) achievement of industria1 composition based 
on heavy chemica1 industries su ch as stee1，巴1ectricity，petro， petrochemica1 and machine. (3) 
extention of exports， (4) a greater increase in human capacity and deve10pment of scientific 
techno10gies， and (5) modernization of agricu1ture and small enterprise. 
In 1962， a P1an for the Pacific Be1t Industria1ization was established and in 1962 the 
Comprehensive Nationa1 Deve10pment P1an made public. Since the 1ate 1950's the business wor1d has 
been concentrating its capita1 and energy on establishing new p1ants in cities in the Pacific Be1t. This 
deve10pment strategy has been followed by the Strategic Point Deve10pment method under the 
Comprehensive Nationa1 Deve10pment P1an. The basic philosophY of the Strategic Point Deve10p-
ment method was to se1ect a limited number of geographically strategic points， deve10p them as idea1 
industria1 cities， and thereby extending the resu1tant economic effect to neighboring areas. The 
government-enacted 1aw a1so promoting the construction of new industria1 cities. According to 
Hiromi Hata (1976:5-6)， the idea of the government initiated method was to set in motion a chain 
of events which may be summarized as follows: 
1. Loca1 government expenditure to improve the industria1 environment (land， water， roads 
and e1ectricity): 
2. Encouragement of the establishment of heavy-chemica1 industry as key enterprises; 
3. The deve10pment of corre1ated industry as a result of the introduction of heavy-chemica1 
industry; 
4. Deve10pment of cities; 
5. Change of life sty1e， particu1ar1y of food consumption patterns (from a rice司centred
pattern); 
6. Change加 agricultura1production加 surroundingrura1 areas (from rice production to 
multiform production); 
7. Raising of individua1 income in the area (urban and rura1); 
8. Increase of 10ca1 government tax revenue; 
9. More public investment in the living environment (schools， medica1 facilities， libraries， 
p訂ks，et旬cι吋.)
10. Improvement of socia1 we1fare in the area 
The reality of the deve10pment plan， however， betrayed the planners theor巴tica1intentions. 
Though 10ca1 governments competed to attract industry as a revenue-generating device， heavy-ch巴m-
ical industry was not easily induced to move into these areas. Consequently， 10cal governments were 
faced with serious financia1 problems. Prior investments for industrial environment improvements 
sudden1y became deficits. Where industries were induced into areas， consequences were increased 
pollution and industria1 disaster rather than increased financial solvency. Because of various tax 
exemptions given to the invited industries， loca1 government revenues， further， did not increase as 
expected. Moreover， loca1 industry， particu1arly fisheries and agriculture， was undermined by 1and 
and sea rights sa1es. 
As an examp1e， Kurashiki city， Okayama prefecture， one of fifteen cities designated as a New 
Industria1 City， began its purchasing paddy fie1ds， upland fie1ds and forest for the industrial1and in 
the 1ate 1950's. The municipa1 government， promoting reclamation to establish Mizushima littora1 
industria1 belt by buying the fisheries rights as of 1960， further transferred industry 1ands to private 
enterprises. After that it granted a bounty equivalent to the fixed property tax of the enterprise. 
Tota1 amounts of the bounty for enterprises by year are as fol1ows: 
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Table 1/ The bounty for enterprises of Kurashiki City 
Year Amount of grant 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
10.5 (million yen)* 
95.9 
123.3 
140.7 
172.6 
236.0 
255.0 
229.0 
208.0 
186.0 
* note: The average million yen equivalent at this time =$41，000.00 
In launching m勾orenterprises， municipal governments injected 2，790 million yen as 
preceeding investments considered essential for industrial base ground work (such as roads， water， 
and lands， etc.) in the three years from 1961 to 1964. When one considers the difference in annual 
municipal revenues betwe巴n1965 (1，555 million yen) and 1970 (2，969 million yen)， th巴positive
impact of these grants on m勾orenterprises rather than their grantors becomes immediately 
apparent. For this reason， municipal finance operated at a deficit since 1967， itscumulative deficit 
reaching 657 million yen from 1967 to 1969. It was ther巴forean illusion that the New lndustrial 
City designation would make municipal finance profitable and resident welfare beneficia1. It became 
obvious that the launching of big business exploited local residents and made disasterous the 
communities of which they were a part. 
Another result was an increase in pollution. In June of 1965 a disrltarge of cyanic acid ions 
into the Mizushima district's Yobimatsu Harbor poisoned large quantitit" of inland sea fishes. Since 
1965 rice plants and other grasses have also withered away and nearly al of the ar旬、 agricultural
products were damaged by air pollution. In Yobimatsu town， a victim's association of fruit growers 
has been organized. A member of the association， an old man since retired from rice dealing， said the 
folJowing in 1974: 
This place was once famous for its scenic beauty. Fishermen could make a good Iiving 
from the ample marine life. But after the beginning of big enterprises， fisheries have suffered 
serious damage. Though 1 was a rice dealer， atthe same time 1 cultivated on orchard. But since 
1965， fruits did not grow well because of air pollution. Then we formed the victim's 
association of fruit growers and struggled against the enterprises， prefectural and municipal 
governments for five years. In the beginning， many peasants gave us the cold shoulder and 
treated us as madmen. My son succeeded a rice dealer who used to sel his product to the 
employees of big enterprises. Now however， most enterprises refuse him because of his 
father's affiliation with the anti-pollution movement. My son complains， saying that he had to 
take care of his children and not to disturb his business. Employees could better theIr position 
in big campanies unless they made trouble with the locals. Consequently， they formed a kind 
of foreign community completely isolated from the local community. Such cIrcumstances and 
ideas were， 1 think， the main sources of increase pollution. Though employees also had to be 
suffering from pollutants they refused to sign their names during四 yanti-pollution signature-
collecting campaign (Saito， 1974: 34-35). 
A sociologist who conducted intensive research of Yobimatsu town reported that al fishes 
taken from the Mizushima inland sea area had been barred from the market as being dangerous to 
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the health. Thus， fishes from certain areas of Mizushima were bought at a price of seventy percent of 
the market value. Such a system of compensation began being carried out in 1967 and its revenue 
sources were covered equally by the prefectural and city governments and related enterprises 
combined. Thus， the catches that fishermen took from these areas were thrown into the fire. When 
an old fisherman was asked why he no longer went fishing he answered，“1 do not want to take fishes 
no one needs no matter how much money 1 can make from them." Compensation aside it was 
obvious that pollution destroyed one's mental as well as one's material life， a life whose meaning 
became irreparably altered. 
II. The “Corporate State" and the Emergence of Environmental Protest 
Dr. Ken'ichi Miyamoto characterized the Japanese government as a kind of "corporate state，" 
in the sense that gigantic corporations subordinate the state to their will running national finance for 
their own profit. One of the main features of Japanese national finance， first of al and most 
important1y， centers on the public investment structure. As can be seen in Table 2 (Miyamoto， 1975: 
61)， the concentration， however， is on the industrial bases with 54.8 percent of the total. In contrast 
to this， and litt1e more than the "road" expenditure of 20.5 percent， isthe 26.1 percent public 
investment into the living base. 
Table 2/ Publicinvestment in the 1960s' 
(bil1ion yen) (%) 
Tota1 33，726.0 100.。
I. Production base (Social means of production) 18，486.7 54.8 
1. Roads 6，915.3 20.5 
2. Harbors 748.6 2.2 
3. Airports 65.9 0.2 
4. Equipage of harbors (inc1uding rec1amation) 753.7 2.2 
5. Nationa1 railroads 3，809.2 11.3 
6. Telegram and telephone 3，453.7 10.2 
7. lndustrial water 328.6 1.0 
8. Agriculture， forestries and fisheries 2，411.7 7.2 
1. Living base (Social means of consumption) 8，799.8 26.1 
9. Urban planning 583.5 1.7 
10. Preparation of housing sites 508.6 1.5 
11. Environmental hygiene 360.8 1.1 
12. Water supply 1，303.9 3.9 
13. Social welfare 691.5 2.1 
14. Drainage 764.4 2.3 
15. Educational faci1ities 2，559.1 7.6 
II. 16. Conservation of nationalland 2，114.1 6.3 
IV. 17. A11 others 4，325.4 12.8 
In 1973， the national government established the Socio-economic Basic Plan with the infusion 
of constructing the “welfare society." It planned to raise public investments in the five year period 
from 1973 to 1977 to 90，000 bi1lion yen. As can be seen in Table 3， however， elements of the 
production base， like industrial roads etc.， remained basically unchanged. 
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Table 3/ Plans and past records of public investment 
Prop1o9se7d 3-ex1p9e7n7 diture Actua9l 6e8x-p1e9n7 dullre 
1968-1972 
Amount of money % Amount of money % (billion yen) (billion yen) 
Environmental hygiene 7，740 8.6 2，012 5.3 
Public rental housing 6，080 6.8 2，388 6.3 
Socia1 welfare 1，820 2.0 1，027 2.7 
Schools 4，370 4.9 2，535 6.7 
Roads 19，000 21.1 8，370 22.1 
Railroads 7，850 8.7 3，349 8.8 
Airports 770 0.9 270 0.7 
Harbors 3，190 3.5 1，101 2.9 
Communications 6，510 7.2 3，730 9.8 
Conservation of lands 5，830 6.5 2，340 6.2 
Agricultures 5，550 6.2 2，263 4.0 
All others 18，290 20.3 8，499 22.4 
Adjustment 3，000 3.3 
Tota1 90，000 100.。 37，884 100.0 
Professor Miyamoto also points out that the “corporate state" is supported by loca1 
governments acting as “agencies" of it and by the “grass-roots conservatism" of local communities. 
As mentioned previously， the local governments have been accomplices in a crime in their invitations 
to industry that has been the cause of pol1ution. Under the“grass-roots ∞nservatism" as well 
discontented residents have grown to the suppression of influential political leaders of the local 
communities. The laboring class， which is expected to change this “conservatism" is control1ed by 
the very enterprises to which laborers belong. J apanese labor unions are general1y organized along 
with their respective enterprises. As a rule， labor unions were reluctant to support the citizen's 
protest against pol1ution， insofar as labor unions shared the interests of industrial management in 
expanding production and improving efficiency. It has been a fact that organized labor as a whole 
has had a passive and occasional1y obstructionist role in the movement to combat pol1ution. 
For example， until 1968， the locallabor union of Minamata Chisso Corporation had opposed 
the Minamata victims， regarding them as “those who would destroy laborer's rice bowls." In another 
case， Yokkaichi local union of Mitsui Kasei Corporation withdrew from the regionalleague of labor 
umons泊 1967when Yokkaichi asthma victims finally fi!ed suit against six of the enterprises 
including Mitsui. As a final example， a labor union of Kanose factory of Showa Denko supported the 
company standing against the programs of the Niigata prefectural labor union council which 
included a policy to support victims of Niigata Minamata disease. 
Under such circumstances， only local residents were incur巴dtoward membership in citizen's 
movements against pol1ution， i.e.， only pot巴ntialvictims of local pol1ution problems had any viable 
interest in citizen's movements. As has become clear， great discriminatory difficulties arose for local 
residents was cause to stand up and protest against pol1uting conditions. Traditional1y， people 
subjected to such personal and environmental1y destructive situations simply endured them by 
“crying themselves to sleep." 
Four major exemplary cases will be reviewed. In the case of Minamata disease， which 
appeared in 1953 in Minamata city， Kumamoto prefecture， ittook twenty years for the district court 
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to order Chisso Corporation to pay compensational monies to al of the victims. Minamata disease 
originally appeared in cats that ate large amounts of discarded fish taken from Minamata Bay. 
Shortly afterward， similar difficulties in neurokgi叫 coordinationbegan to app叩 inad山 humans.
In 1956 Dr. Hajime Hosokawa began studying the disease and announced that it was caused by 
¥ heavy metals ingested via the consumption of¥contaminated fish. In 1959， a Kumamoto University 
team singled out methyl mercury as the probable cause of the disease and named Chisso Corporation 
as the lik巴lysource of the mercury. Chisso's management hired their own study team which not 
surprisingly argued that mercury was not the cause. Thus the real cause remained vague and 
unidentified， and the numbers both contracted and death victim incresed. During the same year， 
victims and fishermen alike tried to negotiate with the Chisso management for the complete 
purification of factory polluted water and the compensation of fishing rights. The negotiation failed， 
however， due to bad faith on the part of Chisso Corporation. 
Then in 1965 a Niigata University team found that residents living along the Agano River in 
Niigata prefecture also had the same neurological symptons associated with Minamata disease. In 
March 1966 the Ministry of Health and Welfare concluded that Niigata Minamata disease was caused 
by methyl mercury originating in wastes from the Kanose plant of Showa Denko (which used the 
same process as Chisso) on the Agano River. The further conclusion that the Minamata experience 
had been suppr巴ssed，permitting a second outbreak of the disease， caused local residents to rise up in 
anger. In August， twenty-two separate local organizations including local unions formed the 
Minamata disease countermeasures council of democratic groups and demanded a solution to the 
pollution problem. In December the victims themselves formed a group. In June 1967， when victims 
sued Showa Denko， they fi!ed Japan's first pollution lawsuit and won. 
The third amoung the“Big Four" pollution verdicts was itai-itai disease in Toyama 
prefecture. Itai-itai disease， now known to be a result of long-term cadmium poisoning， first 
appeared among peasants who lived on the Jintsu River in Toyama prefecture. Cadmium poisoning 
causes britt1eness of bone， such that in one case， for examples， a man who received successive 
pressure fractures of the spine， was shorte 
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contamination. Thus itaiイtaidisease became the first formally recognized pol1ution disease by the 
government. The proceeding lawsuit was concluded meanwhile， the verdict was delivered in June 
1971. Although the itai-itai cas巴wasthe third pollution suit filed， it was the first to arrive a verdict 
victorious to the plaintiffs， and thus played a very important part in setting precedents for fu ture 
pollution litigation. 
The fourth case is that of Yokkaich asthma血 Mieprefecture. The yokkaichi case had been 
filed prior to the Minamata verdict， but differed from the other three cases. Those other major 
pol1ution cases involved water pollution concentrations caused by single sources， whereas the 
Yokkaichi case involved air pollution resulting from multiple sources. Y okkaichi was the area in 
which a large group of heavy industries was established for the first time as a kombinat type of 
regional development. Kombinat is a Russian word referring to a massive complex of manufacturing 
firms of related industries， allocated within close proximity in order to minimize位ansportatlOn
costs. The concern over pollutants released by these firms was first publicized by fishermen， who 
demanded compensation for being unable to sel their strange-包mellingfish caught nearby since 
1958. By 1960 victims of air pollution referred to as Yokkaichi asthma patients were identified. It 
was already an obvious fact that the widespread asthma was a result of the sulfurous fumes produced 
by industries in the kombinat zone. 
In July 1963， the first citizen's assembly was held by the regioal labor association in 
combination with leftist p釘tiesetc. This committee seeking countermeasures to pollution generated 
Yokkaichi city demanded that the city assembly take concrete measures to prevent air pollution and 
further， to force the polluting fums to install effective prevention equipment. A s耐叫arcitizen's 
assembly was held in July 1964， inrelation to the death of one victim. In 1965 and 1967， two 
victims， no longer able to endure their agony， committed suicide. On September 1st， 1967， nine 
from among the hundreds of certified Yokkaichi victims finally filed suit against six of the kombinat 
enterprises. On July 24th， 1972， after almost five years in court， the plaintiffs won their case. 
The m司orpollution lawsuits cases including “Big Four" mentioned with their damages 
awarded are listed in Table 4. Table 5 follows， referencing designa 
situational condition of the victims (McKean， 1981: 68 -72). 
Table/4 Damages awarded in pol1ution diseases litigation 
Number of Total Largest award Date suit Date of Case plaintiffs award to a SInsf e filed verdict plainti 
Cadmium pDoC isoning 31 57 4 
Toyama (million yen) (million yen) March 1968 June 1971 
MNerHcEuarty a PDOC Isoning 
77 270 10 June 1967 Sept. 1971 
Air opkoklauI tion 
Y okkaichi DC 12 88 15 Sept. 1967 July 1972 
Cadmium HoC isorung 
Toyama 33 148.2 12 July 1971 August 1972 
Mercury poisoning 
KumamotoDC l38 930 18 June 1969 March 1973 
PCFB ukPuOoIskoa nDlnC g 
46 683 25.7 Feb. 1969 Oct. 1977 
SMON disease 
Tokyo DC-Wakai 35 870 47 May 1971 Oct. 1977 
SMON disease 
Kanazawa DC 16 431* 38.4* May 1973 March 1978 
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PCB kPuOoIskoa nDinC g 
Fu 729 6，000 17 Nov. 1970 March 1978 
SMON disease 
Tokyo DC 133 3，251 49.7 May 1971 August 1978 
SMON disease 
Hiroshima DC 43 1，070 53.7 April1973 F巴b.1979 
Note: DC = District Court; HC = High Court; Wakai = Court-mediate settlement. 
“Number of plaintiffs" refers only to the number of plaintiffs in the single civil suit in which 
the verdict was pronounced. These are additiona1 PCB suits involving at least 331 plaintiffs， and in 
the case of SMON there are over 28 additiona1 suits. 
* Includes interest (250 and 28 million yen， respectively without interest). 
Table 5/ Pollution disease victims 
Designated pollution diseases Alive Dead Total Applicationns pending 
OKrguanmic amoetro cuarny d FKoaisgonsihnig ma 
1，478 287 1，765 5，982 
Niigata 676 66 742 230 
Cadmium P(iOtaIsto-intaini g dise Toyama (itai-itai disease) 230 120 350 
Tsushima 22 22 
Chronic arsenic trioyide poisoning 
Miyazaki 99 10 109 
Shimane 17 3 20 
Ai4r Ipdoelsui tion disease 
ignated zones (January 1979) 71，190 625 71，815 
Tota1 victims shown above 73，712 
Other Environmentally related 
disease PCB (Kanemi ωoking oil)* 1，578 51 1，629 
Morinaga arsenic powdered milk料 2 11，839 505 12，344 
Tha1idomide*ネ* 253 ヲ 9 
Hexava1ent chromium**** 191 41 232 
SMON***** approximately 11，000 
* PCB or polychlorinated biphenyl， contaminated a large batch of rice bran cooking oil porduc-
ed by the Kanemi Company in North Kyushu. The contaminated oil was sold throughout western 
Japan in 1968. 
** The Morinaga Dairy Corporation accidentally allowed powdered arsenic to enter a large 
batch of powdered formula for babies in 1955， and babies a11 over Japan were affected. 
*** The Japanese tha1idomide disaster was settled out of court in December 1974， with awards 
to individua1 survivors ranging from 3 million yen to 40 million yen. 
**** Hexava1ent chromium poisoning victims釘'econfirmed only among those who have 
handl巴dthe toxin during the course of their work. 
***料 SMONor subacute-myelo・optico・neuropathy，is a disease resulting at least in part from 
the ingestion of large quantities of quinoform (or chinoform)， a drug prescribed for stomach ail-
ments. It produces a variety of chromic central nervous system disabilities up to and including 
para1ysis and blindness. 
IV. Development of Citizen's Movements and the Community in Transition 
On the day the Yokkaichi district court verdict was brought in， residents noted critically that 
“even though victims have been awarded their damages， we can never again restore cleanliness to the 
blue sky." It must be remembered that the lawsuit is the chief， bu t on1y one， ofthe means toward 
compensation employed by citizen's movements， and that such verdicts signal nothing more than the 
approval of public opinion. Lesser effective， more typically passive anti-pollution movements exist as 
108 総合都市研究第18号
we1L Though people organize to rectify problems， a complete stabilization of the situation iS 
difficult regardless of verdict and compensation. Ironically， and unfortunately as well， ifthe goal of 
the movement is the recovery of the original environmental situation， itsachievements in reality 
never come c10se even if ideally successfuL 
The citizen's movement of Mishima and Numazu cities and Shimizu town in Shizuoka 
prefecture in 1964， where the residents prevented the introduction of a new petrochemical 
kombinat， may be regarded as the first successful anti-pollution movements in this sense. In contrast 
to other cases like Minamata where the movement took place after the water pollution had damaged 
individuals severely， the citizen's movement of Mishima-Numazu succeeded in preventing establish-
ment of the pollution industries. 
The governor of Shizuoka prefecture， Toshio Saito， proposed the amalgamation of Mishima， 
Numazu and Sh加包uin May 1963. According to his initial prefectural plan， post-amalgamation 
success of the new city would further consolidate itself by the absorption of outlying towns and 
villages， tobe finally realized as a million population industrial city. At such time， the compr巴hensive
development plan called for the designation of an industrial zone to which petro-chemical industries 
could be invited. This plan was announced in December 1963. However， in1964 a movement began 
in al two cities and a town to oppose both the amalgamation plan and its associated proposal to 
attract petro-chemical industries. The movement succeed within the fol1owing year to persuade 
pro-development local officials to ωncel their plan. 
Professor Miyamoto pointed out three important lessons which can be drew from the above 
movement (1975: 220 -221). First， the success of the movement was due to the united social 
power of the residents. It was estimated that almost 80 -90 percent of the voting population 
supported the movement. The citizen's meeting in Numazu in September 1964， asan example， 
mobil包ed25，000 people， one third of total voting population of the city. In al1 two cities and a 
town， neighborhood association adopted anti-development resolutions and the municipal assemblies 
then， inturn， voted their opposition in total. 
Secondly， the movement sought to encourage small group meetings to procure more exact 
information regarding pollution. High school teachers prepared slide and film presentations， going 
every night to various neighborhood associations to explain the terrible details encountered in other 
industrial cities. Many groups also went to other industrial complexes Iike Yokkaichi to see firsthand 
pollution effects， and brought into stark reality what the future of their own industrial development 
w 
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(waste from paper-pulp processing) that has caused the decimation the once beautiful Tagonoura 
Port on Suruga Bay. Hedoro (slime) is a mass of fine particles and other organic substances， including 
poisonous gases， that accumulate and solidify in shallow bodies of water. 
Fishermen first began petitioning the local authorities for compensation at the close of the 
1950's. At that time， however， no adequate results were obtained. In the meantime， Fuji City， 
Yoshiwara City and Takaoka town were amalgamated into the new “F町iCity" in November 1966. 
The new mayor was the younger bother of the president of Daishowa Paper-Pulp Company， one of 
major companies in the area. In March 1968， the Tokyo Electric Company announced plans to 
construct a thermal power plant on the Fuji River. Anti-pollution movements existing at that time 
sided in the organization of regiona1 groups. These groups wanted the complete elimination of 
hedoro wastes and a dredging of the bay. In th巴 followingApril 1968， one month after the 
construction announcement a citizen's committee of countermeasures on pollution was formed by a 
combination of regiona1 1abor associations and the leftist parties in addition to the existing 
anti-pollu tion activist groups. 
Originally， Tokyo Electric Company planned to construct a thermal plant in Numazu city in 
1964. The plan was canceled because of Numazu citizen's movement opposition in 1964. This 
afforded the people of F町 tolearn of Mishima-Numazu experiences which enhanced the wide 
mobilization of residents. The movements demanding to stop the disposal of hedoro into the sea and 
further construction of industries was now combined and spearheaded toward a total halt of thermal 
power plant construction. Finally， inJanuary 1970， the reformist candidate for mayor defeated the 
paper-pulf sponsored candidate， sealing construction blockage in Fuji. 
In November 1970， the movement fi!ed a civil suit against the prefectural governor and the 
four major pulp companies. An out-of-court settlement in December 1976 awarded 1.1 billion yen 
to the fisherman's cooperative association. And in september 1977， a Tokyo high court， ruling that 
the dumping of hedoro was ilegal， ordered the pulp companies to find other means of waste 
disposal， and further， toreimburse the prefecture for expense incurred in dredging Tagonoura Bay 
(Mckean， 1981: 32). 
The success of the movement noted here， however， asop 
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Table 6/ Results of development plan questionnaires 
nSdui. pporters Initially Uncondi- Condi- Opponents D.K. Total 
tioned tioned opposed 
Dec. 1973 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Municipal workers 10 5.0 136 67.3 50 24.8 6 3.0 202 
Employees of companies 22 6.8 233 72.4 46 14.3 21 6.5 322 
Entrepreneurs 14 10.3 101 74.3 14 10.3 7 5.1 136 
Others 10 7.1 89 63.6 24 17.1 17 12.1 140 
Tota1 56 7.0 559 69.9 134 16.7 51 6.4 800 
Dec.1974 
Municipa1 workers 5 7.6 40 60.6 19 28.8 2 3.0 66 
Employees of companies 18 8.1 159 71.3 25 11.2 21 9.4 223 
Entrepreneurs 15 21.7 51 73.9 1 1.4 2 2.9 69 
Others 22 7.4 186 62.6 45 15.2 44 14.8 297 
Total 60 9.4 436 66.6 90 13.7 69 10.5 655 
Dec. 1975 
Municipal workers 2 2.8 47 66.2 14 19.7 8 11.3 71 
Employees of companies 24 9.9 195 80.6 10 4.1 13 5.4 242 
Emtrepreneurs 15 16.0 71 75.5 5 5.3 3 3.2 94 
Others 18 7.0 186 72.4 22 8.6 31 12.1 257 
Total 59 8.9 499 75.1 51 7.7 55 8.3 664 
Dec. 1976 
Municipa1 workers 2 2.7 39 53.4 17 23.3 11 15.1 4 5.5 73 
Employees of companies 25 9.7 164 63.8 50 19.5 10 3.9 8 3.1 257 
Entrepreneurs 15 15.0 69 69.0 9 9.0 3 3.0 4 4.0 100 
Others 17 6.8 153 60.9 50 19.9 14 5.6 17 6.8 251 
Total 59 8.7 425 62.4 126 18.5 38 5.6 33 4.8 681 
Dec. 1977 
Municipal workers 6 6.5 47 50.5 18 19.3 16 17.2 6 6.5 93 
Employees of companies 46 14.0 174 52.9 46 14.0 26 7.9 37 11.2 329 
Entrepreneurs 32 21.8 68 46.2 26 17.7 14 9.5 7 4.8 147 
Others 41 9.8 178 42.5 73 17.4 44 10.5 83 19.8 419 
Tota1 125 12.6 468 47.3 163 16.5 100 10.1 133 13.5 988 
Nov.1978 
Municipal workers 10 13.1 38 50.0 17 22.4 7 9.2 4 5.3 76 
Employees of companies 49 14.0 170 48.7 71 20.3 21 6.0 38 10.9 349 
En trepreneurs 15 13.1 .53 46.5 22 19.3 6 5.3 18 15.8 114 
Others 28 6.5 197 45.4 102 23.5 27 6.2 80 18.4 434 
Tota1 102 10.5 458 47.0 212 21.8 61 6.3 140 14.4 973 
Motojima and Shoji， eds.， 1980: 21， initially from the Tomakomai Minposha. 
Tomakomai is one of five focal areas the government selected according to its New 
Comprehensive National Development Plan in 1969. The basic strategy of the development plan was 
the establishment of gigantic industrial bases in remote areas. According to the plan， for example， 
the gigantic Mutsu-Ogawara industrial base in Aomori prefecture would refine two mil1ion barrels of 
αude oil per day. In the case of Tomakomai， one million barrels will be processed per day. No one 
knows what effect these huge petro-chemical industries will have on the natural and social 
environment of the area. Central and loca1 governments are using a1l the devices available to them to 
persuade the local people of the advantages of industrial complex development. If the government 
and the business world are successful in their drive to establish these gigantic complexes， the 
pollution produced cannot help but add to the detriment of the health and nature of the Japanese 
land and people. 
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As Table 6 indicates， however， the people of Tomakomai are most1y conditioned supporters. 
Opposition was 16.7 percent in 1973 and declined in 1978 to 6.3 percent. After construction was 
begun 1976， the statistical column “initially opposed" was added. From the questionnaire results， 
one may speculate that from among those who once opposed the plan， conditional support arose. 
Although it is rather difficult to make a c1ear-cut distinction between anti-development and 
conditioned pro-development， statistics， the unconditional supporters of the plan on the other hands， 
encompass only a sma11 portion of total population: 7.0 percent in 1973 to 10.5 percent in 1978. 
In Tomakomai， the city authorities attempted first to promote the national development plan 
through the construction of an industrial harbor to the east of the city in 1968. But when the master 
plan was announced by the national government泊 1970，they were sorely embarrassed by its 
extraordinarily large scale and suddenly reluctant to lend it support. Thus in November 1973， the 
city basic plan for the development of the eastern part of Tomakomai was announced as an 
independent action. Although referred to as“the city plan" it essentially represented the “first 
stage" of the national project. In 1973， an association to oppose the development was form巴dby 
labor unions and the leftist parties. The strategy of the association was to demand the complete 
withdrawal of the plan. Reformists. campaining for this strategic goal， focused their fight in the 
mayor's election of April 1975. The former mayor， however， appealing in his election campain that 
he would promote the development plan event at the risk of his political career， defeated the 
reformist candidate. At this point， the movement， headed by the association of regional labor， 
socialist， and communist parties， had no alternatives against the regional development. Although the 
movement had always presupposed the existence of a national plan and stood ready to oppose it， 
few other efforts were made to single out the actual needs of local residents. Except for the few 
people who did not want further “development" of the city， most citizens fundamentally agreed 
with the indigenous regional development plan， ifit were to be at a1 possible， even in the face of 
anxiety regarding developmental exploitation and subsequent po11ution by the national government. 
The second difficulty of citiz 
consensus of opinion among the residents. 
Community formation is one of the important goals of the citizen's movement， inthe sense 
that the citizen's movement is in itself a community formation; the community being based on 
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democratic self-government. To this regard in her excellent study， Dr. McKean has argued that the 
characteristics of Japanese citizen's movements are as follows: 
Their massage is home-grown， not imported， indicating that Japanese political culture had 
an indigenous potan tial for democratic “evolution". To the Japanese who have become active 
in citizen's movements， the idea they have something called “rights" which have been 
“unjust1y" trampled upon， that the system its巴lfowes them some recourse， that democratic 
procedures are actually devices that exist precisely for the situation in which they find 
themselves， isa ttractive and satisfying. It helps them to interpret situation and it gives them 
guidance in responding to it (McKean， 1981: 268). 
She then conc1udes her argument by citing an elder1y fisherman: 
In this kind of situation， we used to just put up with it and cry ourselves to sleep. But this 
time it affected our economic circumstances and our health. So we just had to rise up and 
protest against it. Why itwent against the ideas of democratic politics!…The way things are 
now， the government tels the people what to do， but it's supposed to the other way around， 
you know (ibid. ). 
Almost thirty five years ago in 1948， E.Herbert Norman was invited to address an anniversary 
celebration at Keio University in Tokyo， titling his lecture “Persuasion or F orce". In this lecture he 
explained， self-government “means that the people look upon government officia1s astheir servants 
or as their deputies and not as their masters. It is the very opposite of that old concept， kanson 
minpi". Kanson minpi means literally，“official-revering， people-despising"; or more proper1y， 
putting government above people， overestimating government at the expense of people. Norman、s
argument is， 1 believe， sti1 important to the present situation of J apan. He conc1uded his speach at 
Keio with this remarks: 
Once liberty is dead， people must lose their self-respect; despair， envy， deceit and ma1ice 
wi1l grow apace like weeds in a deserted garden…・ butno people who have lost their freedom 
can bequeath any lasting benefit to succeeding ages. They wil11eave behind no inspiration or 
generous work to which their descendants can look with pride and gratitude. 
. Persuasion is not only the way of reason and humanity， itis now the sole path of self-
preservation. Thus we are， alof us， whatever our nation or status， faced with the stern alterna-
tive: PERSUADE OR PERISH. 
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